Wednesday, September 17, 2008

My first entry.

This is my first time to write about ergonomics. I'm not too sure yet what to write about. I'm not that aware of objects around me that possess or exhibit the design principles of ergonomics. It's easier though to look at errors and see how it could've gone wrong or how it could've been better.



One example would probably be the Chatsworth train collision a few days ago when the Metrolink commuter train had a head-on collision with the Union Pacific freight train. It's kinda creepy because I was riding the Metrolink a few weeks ago from Camarillo to Burbank and this was the same route as the accident. It was a tragic accident, so I hope no one minds that I use it as an example.

Reports say that it was the fault of the engineer of the Metrolink train - because first, he was texting just a few minutes before the train collided (while operating the train) and second, because he missed the red railway signal which means he does not have permission to proceed. Usually though, it is what people would normally do - blame the person who most likely caused the accident. I mean, it is so easy to point at who to be blamed for. Well yes, he was not paying attention obviously because he missed the red signal, probably because he was texting. But these assumptions are basically just assumptions, whether or not he really is to be blamed for.

After reading the first chapter of the book, including the prefaces, it did give me a different perspective of looking at things around us. We cannot solely blame the driver of the train. In the first place, why design ONE rail where trains in opposite directions travel on it? Regardless of stop signs along the way, at one point two trains will collide head-on. What if the lights are broken? What if for some important reason you had to look away and miss the stop sign? These things can happen. And apparently, it did.

This railway system obviously lacks several of the design principles. One is visibility. There weren't that much visible signs that both trains were approaching each other. Maybe a stop sign here and there - but once those are missed, there were no other signs to tell that there is danger ahead. There were no signs inside the engineer's station that there was a train coming in their direction either. The only visible sign that happened was actually seeing the train in front of them, which is obviously too late to stop the accident from happening.

I guess this is also related to feedback. Since there was no feedback received at all by the engineer that what he was doing on the last few minutes was wrong, he proceeded on. Nothing told him there was danger ahead so he did not stop.

The railway system also lacked constraints. Maybe it would be expensive, but it would help prevent these kinds of accidents if there was an automatic break at the stop sign, or something that would prevent these trains from moving forward, for the very reason that there is danger ahead. Or maybe an automatic slow in the speed to inform the engineer that something was wrong.

Well these are just my personal observations. I guess it would be fair if the actual railway system was studied thoroughly to see where the real problems come from.

*Photo taken from Wikipedia.org

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